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Modern, analytical tools are critical to understand the impact of open 
architecture technology and open business models on naval warfighting processes 
and procedures.  These tools must measure the operational value of a system from 
an end-user, warfighter perspective, identify areas of deficiencies in capabilities, and 
flag areas for potential acquisitions.  One advantage of examining open architected 
system upgrade options from a warfighter perspective is that the new systems can 
be integrated with reengineered processes more easily leading to improved process 
performance. This perspective, using OA to upgrade existing IWS systems, ensures 
that upgrades will lead to improved warfighting capabilities. Traditional measurement 
tools used for cost analysis cannot calculate the total value of upgrading a system to 
support an improved warfighting capability, particularly the improved operational 
value resulting from reengineering of warfighting processes.   
The Knowledge Value Added/Real Options (KVA+RO) Valuation Framework 
is a tool designed to assist decision-makers in making technology acquisitions.  This 
paper describes research using the KVA+RO framework for estimating return on 
investment, in an open architecture approach, to upgrading and/or replacing aging 
IWS AEGIS and SSDS systems. The results of the research indicated that using the 
open architecture (OA)model, in combination with  the “leave and layer” approach, 
was approximately five times more valuable than the current proprietary approach to 
system replacement and was approximately twice as valuable as a complete retrofit 
and replace strategy. “Leave and layer” provided the highest return on investment 
for replacing the AEGIS system with the lowest risk. The ultimate success of the OA 
approach is dependent on the ability of the multiple parties to system development 
and deployment to collaborate.  Collaboration, along with the tools that facilitate 
collaboration, is critical to the success of any of the OA approaches. 
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I. Executive Summary 
The US Navy (Navy) is transforming traditional business practices through 
Naval Open Architecture (Naval OA).  Naval OA, a multi-faceted, enterprise-wide 
business model and product-line strategy leverages “open” computer design 
principles and architectures.  It expands the technological open architecture (OA) 
model and taps into a multiple-developer network to deliver cost-effective, 
innovative, and rapid/spiral acquisition capabilities. In the migration to an OA 
business model, billions of dollars in software and hardware development 
expenditures, along with subsequent maintenance costs, are at stake. 
PEO IWS tasked a research team from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
to develop a methodology for estimating return on investment (ROI) using an OA 
approach to upgrading and/or replacing the aging Integrated Weapons Systems 
(IWS)  AEGIS and SSDS systems.  The methodology also had to be capable of 
estimating total value of strategic alternative options for replacing existing AEGIS 
functionality.    
Approaching the project from a customer-based, warfighter perspective, the 
NPS team applied the Knowledge Value Added/Real Options (KVA+RO) 
valuation/risk portfolio management framework to reengineering situational 
awareness (SA) procedures used in the AEGIS and SSDS platforms.1   Track 
management sub-processes used in SA procedures were analyzed through the KVA 
process reengineering methodology under “As Is,” “To Be,” “Radical 1,” and Radical 
2” scenarios.  ROI metrics on individual sub-processes and watch stations for 
AEGIS and SSDS were generated through KVA, with a particular focus on systems 
interoperability.  ROI estimates reached as high as 404% for AEGIS and 399% for 
SSDS. 
                                            
1   Although the total functionalities of AEGIS and SSDS IWS systems are so broad, we focused on situational awareness 
because it is the most promising area for upgrading and reengineering.   
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Real options analysis was then performed to determine the prospective value 
of upgrading the AEGIS IWS over a nine-year period from KVA data inputs. Three 
options of “Strategy A: As Is” (i.e., maintain the existing proprietary approach), 
“Strategy B: DDX OA—Develop and Retrofit” (i.e., develop a complete system using 
an OA approach and replace the existing AEGIS system), and “Strategy C: Aegis 
OA—Leave and Layer” (i.e., use an OA approach and replace AEGIS modules over 
time)  represent potential system development and deplolyment strategies; each a 
unique path with risks and benefits.  Real Options values ranged from $12 billion to 
$58.8 billion for the strategic choices. 
A. The KVA+RO Framework 
KVA+RO is a comprehensive measurement process and an integrated tool 
set that defines, measures and evaluates the total value of given IWS acquisitions.  
It captures data across a spectrum of organizations to compare returns on 
investments, outputs, processes, capabilities, risks, strategic alternatives, costs, and 
value (i.e., comparable revenue).  KVA+RO analytically quantifies uncertainty and 
risks elements inherent in predicting the future, includes ways to mitigate these risks 
through strategic options with analysis of alternatives, and by analytically developing 
and allocating budgets to optimize project portfolios.  
1. Knowledge-based Metrics: Knowledge Value Added (KVA) 
KVA measures the value provided by human capital assets and IT assets by 
an organization, process or function at the sub-process level.  Using a “market 
comparables” valuation technique, it monetizes the outputs of all assets, including 
intangible knowledge assets. Using market comparables provides a means for 
valuing the outputs of warfighting processes in the common units of money. This, in 
turn, makes it possible to use powerful financial metrics in forecasting the value of 
various strategic options for replacing aging IWS systems.  
Capturing the value embedded in an organization’s core processes, 
employees and IT enables the actual cost and revenue of a product or service to be 
calculated.  Analyses like ROI on individual projects, programs, processes and sub-
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processes within a portfolio of IT acquisitions can be derived through the KVA 
methodology.   
2. Risk Analysis: Real Options (RO)  
Potential strategic investments can then be evaluated with real options 
analysis based on KVA data. The analysis applied is a robust and analytical process 
incorporating the risk identification (applying various sensitivity techniques), risk 
quantification (applying Monte Carlo simulation), risk valuation (applying real options 
analysis), risk mitigation (utilizing real options framing), and risk diversification 
(employing analytical portfolio optimization).  
3. Study Results and Recommendations Summary 
The results of our analysis include: 
• The KVA+RO valuation framework, a viable methodology for 
estimating ROIs and projecting valuation of acquisition options, 
should be used across the board. Several Department of Defense 
projects are implementing the framework. The methodology also 
supports the CNO’s recent directive of accelerating adoption of open-
business models and providing a methodology to assess the business 
risks and benefits of various OA-based acquisition strategies.  
• Upgrading existing IWS functionality to support reengineering 
elements of existing track-management process appears 
beneficial.  ROIs ranged from 212% to 404% for the AEGIS platform 
and ROIs for the SSDS platform were also significant.  ROI results are 
shown in Figures 1 and 2.2  In addition, Tables 1 and 2 provide a 
detailed analysis of the ROIs for reengineering the track management 
process. Table 3 summarizes the reengineered processes and 
                                            
2  Radical 1 scenario assumes the improvements of the “To Be” scenario while the Radical 2 scenario assumes cumulative 
improvements from all three scenarios.   
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subsequent benefits. The results are based on the assumption that the 
IWS systems could be developed within an OA framework to support 
the reengineered process designs. 





























Tables 1 and 2 are more detailed results for ROI analysis for “As Is” and the other three 
increasingly automated scenarios. 
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Table 1.  Detailed ROI Estimates for AEGIS 
 
AS IS TO BE RAD 1 RAD 2
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information 3421% 3307% 3063% 2633%
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track" -91% -91% 2061% 1756%
Verify Other Track Sources -95% -95% -95% -96%
Correlate sub-total 1184% 1141% 1506% 1296%
TRACK
Monitor Suspect Tracks -98% -99% -99% -99%
Update Tracks -97% -97% 361% 310%
Update GCCS-M -97% 91% 84% 69%
Track sub-total -98% -94% -58% -64%
IDENTIFY
Verify IFF signal 802% 769% 706% 607%
Verify EW emissions -91% -91% -92% 509%
Verify Point of Origin -98% 4121% 3821% 3332%
Match Against ATO -98% 4206% 3890% 3382%
Match Against CommAir Profile 863% 835% 763% 643%
Match Against Intel Information -97% -97% -97% 3814%
Examine Kinematic Data -96% -96% -97% -97%
Obtain Visual ID -100% -100% -100% -100%
Conduct Verbal Query -99% -99% -99% -99%
Identify sub-total 8% 60% 50% 326%
RELAY
Send Over Links -87% -88% -89% -90%
Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units -98% -99% -99% -99%
Relay sub-total -97% -98% -98% -99%
Totals 212% 240% 273% 404%
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Table 2.  Detailed ROI Estimates for SSDS 
AS IS TO BE RAD 1 RAD 2
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information 3393% 3280% 3026% 2598%
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track" -91% -91% 2530% 2158%
Verify Other Track Sources -95% -95% -96% -96%
Correlate sub-total 1174% 1131% 1512% 1301%
TRACK
Monitor Suspect Tracks -98% -99% -99% -99%
Update Tracks -96% -97% 546% 475%
Update GCCS-M -98% 14% 10% 1%
Track sub-total -98% -96% -53% -60%
IDENTIFY
Verify IFF signal 790% 757% 692% 595%
Verify EW emissions -90% -91% -91% 474%
Verify Point of Origin -98% 3689% 3405% 2967%
Match Against ATO -98% 3813% 3510% 3049%
Match Against CommAir Profile 926% 896% 816% 688%
Match Against Intel Information -97% -97% -97% 3688%
Examine Kinematic Data -96% -96% -96% -96%
Obtain Visual ID -100% -100% -100% -100%
Conduct Verbal Query -99% -99% -99% -99%
Identify sub-total 12% 59% 48% 316%
RELAY
Send Over Links -82% -83% -84% -86%
Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units -99% -99% -99% -99%
Relay sub-total -97% -98% -98% -98%
Totals 212% 237% 271% 399%  
 
Table 3 discusses the potential impact of an OA approach on AEGIS and 
SSDS. 
Table 3.  Potential Benefits of OA Combined with Reengineering of Track 
Management Operations 
 
 “As Is” “To Be” “Radical 1” “Radical 2” 










• Info provided in ATO could be 
upgraded into AEGIS, 
reducing manpower 
requirements. 
• Enables greater sensor and 
data integration, providing 
enhanced correlation in 
pinpointing origin of aircraft or 
ship. 
• Streamlined system automatically 
updates tracks. 
• Increased information-sharing and 
collaborative technology allows for 
automatic correction of multiple tracks 
per target. 
• Continuously updates tracks, allowing 
for pinpoint accuracy. 
• Collaborative technology minimizes 
possibility of multiple tracking of 
targets. 
• Includes changes from “To Be” 
 
• Collaborative technology automatically 
updates ship’s systems with Intel 
information. 
• Electronic communication of data from EW 
to CIC personnel facilitates COTS-based 
environment that easily upgrades to 
accommodate greater processor speeds.  
• Greatly enhances CIC efficiency through 
more timely SA.   







• Reduces maintenance costs.  
 
• Frees watch-standers to 
perform other tasks while 
providing faster data flow.   
• Increases accuracy of tracking targets. 
 
 
• Substantial re-engineering leads to drastic 
reduction in watch-stander work time, 
greatly reducing human error and further 




• Strategy C: Leave and Layer is the most promising strategy with 
lowest total costs.  It has the highest potential rate of return with a 
valuation of $58.8 billion and 4.9 times the potential return than Strategy A.   
Strategy B has a valuation of $23.2 billion, while Strategy A has the lowest 
valuation at $12 billion.   
Table 4.  Real Options Valuation Results: Strategies A-C 
 
 Strategy A Strategy B Strategy C 
STRATEGIC OPTION 
“As Is” DDX OA “Develop and Retrofit” 
AEGIS OA 
“Leave & Layer” 
Net Present Value $12.00B $6.38B $27.52B 
Real Options Value $12.00B $23.16B $58.84B 
Total Cost $10.00B $24.00B $9.09B 
Strategic Real Options-
based Relative Return Ratio 1.00 1.9 4.9 
   
• Collaboration is critical.  OA as an acquisition, development and 
deployment framework will not succeed without the support of a 
collaborative infrastructure to facilitate the introduction of multiple 
large, medium and smaller players and their necessary interactions 
with users of the systems (e.g., warfighters), the acquisition 
community, and Navy leadership.  Significant investments will be 
required for the infrastructure necessary to enable all parties 
(acquirers, users, developers) to collaborate easily and effectively in an 
OA model. 
• Performance monitoring is required.  If the performance of 
acquisition strategies is not monitored over time, the probability of 
success will be greatly reduced.  Performance measurement systems  
(i.e. performance accounting software), in conjunction with predictive 
forecasting software programs, provide additional analytic support to 
IWS systems-acquisition strategies. 
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These research results, along with components of the KVA+RO framework 
and key findings from the analysis, are summarized in this report. 3 
B. Summary 
IWS systems developed in a closed, proprietary model have performed well 
and provide substantial returns.  However, a new paradigm is required to maintain 
military superiority and wage information-age warfare.  Through open architected 
system development and open-business models, benefits such as reusable code, 
lower maintenance-upgrade costs, and greater vendor flexibility in supporting 
system module upgrades could be derived.  Moreover, the Navy can leverage new 
technology by quickly adopting it to warfighter needs.  
This study found that the “leave and layer” option for IWS replacement 
provided the lowest costs, highest ROIs, and highest strategic options value with the 
lowest risk. The results recommend use of the OA – leave and layer IWS 
replacement approach to support reengineered warfighting processes.
                                            
3   The accuracy of our analysis is dependent on data and information provided by subject-matter experts. KVA analysis 
includes tests of the reliability of their estimates. 
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II. Introduction 
Naval Open Architecture (Naval OA) is a multi-faceted, enterprise-wide 
business model and product-line strategy designed to fully capitalize on “open” 
computer design principles and architectures. Expanding on the technological open 
architecture (OA) model, Naval OA leverages, “open business models for the 
acquisition and spiral development of new systems that enable multiple developers 
to collectively and competitively participate in cost-effective and innovative capability 
delivery to the Naval Enterprise” (Mullen, 2006, August 28).  The new OA business 
model requires a greater degree of collaboration among customers (e.g., warfighter), 
builders (e.g., small, medium, and large technology companies), and buyers (e.g., 
the acquisition community) than the existing closed, proprietary IWS business 
model.   In the migration to an OA business model, billions of dollars in hardware 
and software development expenditures, along with subsequent maintenance costs, 
are at stake. 
To understand the potential impact of OA technology and business models on 
naval warfighting processes and procedures, analytical tools are critical for decision-
makers as they manage their portfolio of options. Portfolio management requires 
that these tools quantify the risks, costs, and net value of potential IWS acquisitions. 
The tools must be able to help identify where gaps exist in current processes and to 
project anticipated returns on investments to fill those gaps. 
This study describes research conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) using the Knowledge Value Added/Real Options (KVA+RO) valuation/risk 
portfolio management framework.  KVA+RO is a comprehensive measurement tool 
set that defines, measures and evaluates total value of given IWS acquisitions.  It 
captures data across a spectrum of organizations to compare outputs, processes, 
capabilities, risks, costs, and value (i.e. comparable revenue).  KVA+RO analytically 
quantifies uncertainty and risk elements inherent in predicting the future, includes 
ways to mitigate these risks through strategic options and by analytically developing 
and allocating budgets to optimize project portfolios. Understanding uncertainties 
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and mitigating the potential impact of risks significantly improves the likelihood of 
successful acquisition decisions.   
In this study, KVA+RO is used to assess the implications of OA on SA 
procedures onboard the AEGIS and SSDS platforms.  Focusing on systems 
interoperability, KVA methodology is first applied to generate knowledge-based, ROI 
metrics on individual sub-processes and watch stations involved in track-
management processes.   The potential impact of OA on track management 
processes and sub-processes is analyzed under several scenarios: “To Be,” 
“Radical 1,” and “Radical 2” for AEGIS and SSDS.  Potential investments are then 
evaluated for AEGIS through real options analysis, resulting in net present value 
(NPV) of three strategic alternatives ranging from $6.4 billion to $27.5 billion over a 
nine-year period and options valuations of from $23.2 to $58.8 billion. 
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III. Lessons from the “Open” Solutions Movement 
Disruptive forces and accelerating shifts in technology have enabled 
organizations to leverage open technology platforms to achieve greater productivity 
and efficiency levels.  These “open” solutions offer new possibilities for solving 
business problems, provide business interoperability by standardization and 
technology transparency, and decrease time to market for key products and 
services.  Organizations are adopting open technology platforms and open-source 
software for critical business needs, moving into mainstream business practices in 
corporations such as IBM, Google, Intel, JPMorgan Chase, Merrill Lynch and Pfizer.   
One manifestation of the movement toward “openness,” yet to be embraced 
by the Department of Defense (DoD), is the open-source software movement.  
Germany, Australia, the United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, Canada, China, Japan 
and Brazil are among the increasing number of governments embracing open-
source software.  Open-source software is growing at such a rate that it represents 
the most significant all-encompassing and long-term trend that the software industry 
has seen since the early 1980s, according to a recent study by International Data 
Corporation (IDC).  IDC’s survey of over 5,000 developers in 116 countries found 
that open source software is being used by 71% of developers in the world and is in 
production at 54% of their organizations.  
Open-source software development site SourceForge.net reported more than 
129,000 projects in 2006, up from 1,362 projects in 2000.  Google’s 2006 “Summer 
of Code” open-source initiative has 630 collaborative projects pumping more than $3 
million back into the open-source community.  There are now more than 55 Open-
Source Initiative (OSI) certified open-source licenses available given the popularity 
of open-source software.4   The success of this movement has been predicated on 
                                            
4  According to OSI, the most commonly used licenses are: Apache License,  GNU General Public License (GPL), GNU Lesser 
General Public License (LGPL), Modified BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution) License (new BSD) and Mozilla Public 
License (MPL). MPL is the most widely used since 1998.  A NASA license is also available (OSI, 2006). 
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the ability of the multiple parties involved to easily collaborate across organizational, 
field-specific, and national boundaries.  While this approach to software 
development may not directly apply to security-sensitive systems such as IWS, 
lessons can be learned by examining the results of this movement in the commercial 
world. 
A. Collaboration is Key  
As with the use of the OA technology and business model, open-source is 
built on the tenants of open access and collaboration.  The lessons learned when 
“openness” is applied to system development and business models from the open-
source movement is that such approaches allow access to a wider development 
community that can adapt, improve and fix software at a faster and more agile pace 
than can a proprietary vendor.  Organizations are also not locked-into one vendor or 
product.   
Google, for example, has acknowledged that the open architecture of Google 
Maps, allowing external developers to build applications on top of it, greatly 
contributed to the mapping service’s functionality and diversity at a greater level than 
the company could have done internally (Perez, 2006, March 6).   In 2005, IBM 
opened access to 500 corporate software patents, forfeiting $10 million dollars in 
annual royalties.  According to IBM, technological advances are often dependent on 
shared knowledge, standards and collaborative innovation (IBM, 2005, January 11).   
IBM believes that by being allowed access to those patents, open-source developers 
will help foster continued innovation.   
It’s critical to note that the full potential of OA and open-business model 
approaches cannot be achieved without a basic collaborative technology 
infrastructure. The ease with which all parties share ideas, compare requirements, 
develop solutions, test system capabilities, and finally participate jointly in deploying 
systems is dependent on their commitment to collaborate openly and fully with each 
other. This can only be facilitated, realistically and practically, through collaborative 
technology.  Benefits from this type of approach have been previously demonstrated 
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in shipyard planning where the use of product lifecycle management (PLM) 
collaborative software added tremendous potential value to the process (Komoroski, 
C., Housel, T., Hom, S., & Mun, J., 2006, October). 
B. Open Architecture and the Department of Defense 
Computer software plays a critical component in maintaining the nation’s 
defenses.  For example, less than 10% of its functionality was provided by software 
when the F-4 fighter was developed in the 1960’s; at least 80% of the F/A-22’s 
functionality is software related (GAO, 2004, March).  Although the DoD spends 
billions of dollars to develop and maintain rights to millions of lines of code, such 
software cannot be accessed or modified by anyone but the original vendor because 
of its proprietary nature (Payton, 2006, August 14).   Moreover, the DoD will spend 
as much as $12 billion on reworking software for major weapons acquisitions 
programs—30% of its estimated budget of $40 billion for research, development, 
testing and evaluation in Fiscal Year 2006 (Wait, 2006, July 3).   Consequences 
resulting from the lack of OA and open business models include: 
• increased development and maintenance costs for information technology;  
• lock-in to obsolete proprietary technologies;  
• inability to extend existing capabilities in months versus years; and  
• lack of interoperability due to opacity and stove-piping of information systems. 
(Herz, J.C., Lucas, M., & Scott, J., 2006)    
The DoD has at least 115 open-source software applications used in more 
than 250 applications.  However,  IWS software acquisitions are still made with the 
same industrial-age business models used to acquire ships, tanks and other 
physical machinery (Payton, 2006, August 14).   The traditional business model of 
purchasing physical goods and services falls short when applied to acquiring digital 
assets like IWS technology.  New business models are required to acquire IWS 
technology to wage information-age warfare requiring responsiveness and agility, 
according the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and 
Concepts, Dr. Sue Payton (Payton, 2006, August 14).   Moving to an open 
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architecture model maximizes IT acquisitions by saving development dollars, 
reducing development cycles, and fostering new and innovative solutions and 
capabilities. 
Modern, analytical tools are also necessary to deploy an open solutions 
business strategy.  These tools must measure the operational value of a system 
from the warfighter’s perspective, identify areas of deficiencies in capabilities, and 
flag areas for process improvement. Traditional measurement tools used for cost 
analysis cannot calculate the total value of a system, particularly operational value 
provided by specific process improvements.  At the tactical level, an operator does 
not define capabilities merely in cost terms but also in time, efficiency and 
effectiveness gains like processing more targets within a given time period.  Given 
new potential threats, such as “swarm” attacks where there may be thousands of 
targets at any one time, the warfighter’s perspective in developing open and agile 
systems is critical. Focusing on the potential cost reductions from the OA and open 
business models approach may lead developers and acquirers away from the real 
needs of the warfighter. Maintaining a focus on the potential value produced, in 
addition to potential cost savings, is critical to the success of OA and open business 
models. 
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IV. KVA+RO Framework 
The KVA+RO methodology provides an equal focus on the potential value 
and cost of new IWS systems. KVA+RO measures operating performance, cost-
effectiveness, return on investments, risk, real options (capturing strategic flexibility), 
and analytical portfolio optimization. In this study, it was applied to the problem of 
finding the most promising solution for replacing aging IWS systems such as AEGIS 
and SSDS to support reengineered warfighting capabilities.  KVA+RO analysis 
empowers decision-makers and supports IWS acquisition strategies by providing 
performance-based data and scenario analysis.  Analyses like ROI on individual 
IWS projects and programs, as well as processes and sub-processes (e.g., track 
management processes in the present study) supported by IWS systems can be 
examined within a portfolio of acquisitions framed through the KVA+RO 
methodology.    An overview of the framework is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  NPS Valuation Framework 
REAL OPTIONS ANALYSIS
• Risk Identification: List projects and strategies to evaluate.
• Risk Prediction: Base case projections for each project.
• Risk Modeling:  Develop static financial models.
• Risk Analysis:  Dynamic Monte Carlo simulation.
• Risk Mitigation: Frame real options.
• Risk Hedging:  Options analytics, simulation & optimization.
• Risk Diversification: Portfolio optimization and asset allocation.
• Risk Management:   Iterative analysis.
Analyzes/Forecasts 






• Calculate learning time for each sub-process.
• Derive costs and revenues for each sub-process.
• Calculate metrics:
Return on Investment (ROI)
Return on Knowledge (ROK)
DATA COLLECTION
• Collect baseline data.
• Conduct interviews with subject matter experts.
• Identify sub-processes.
• Research market comparable data.




The framework has been used in a variety of NPS analyses, including 
evaluating the potential impact of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology on 
naval maintenance/modernization processes.  In the study involving one specific 
area of shipyard planning for maintenance alterations, cost savings were projected 
to exceed $40 million per year and manpower requirements drastically reduced with 
commercial-off–the-shelf, three-dimensional scanning/visualization technology and 
collaborative PLM technology (Komoroski, C., Housel, T., Hom, S., & Mun, J., 2006, 
October).  Key components of the NPS Valuation framework are further discussed in 
this section. 
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A.  Knowledge-based Metrics:  Knowledge Value Added 
(KVA) 
KVA measures the value provided by human capital assets and IT assets 
(e.g., IWS systems + human operators) by an organization, process or function at 
the sub-process level.  It monetizes the outputs of all assets, including intangible 
knowledge assets.  Capturing the value embedded in an organization’s core 
processes, employees and IT enables the actual cost and revenue of a product or 
service to be calculated. Figure 2 identifies the types of assets used to produce 
output; outputs can be products or services produced by that organization.    
Figure 2.  Measuring Output 
Figure 3 shows how KVA process costing differs from traditional accounting 
methods. 
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Information Technology Assets
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Compensation                   $5,000
Benefits/OT                         1,000
Supplies/Materials              2,000
Rent/Leases                       1,000
Depreciation                       1,500
Admin. And Other                 900
Total                              $11,400
Review Task                        $1,000
Determine Op                        1,000
Input Search Function           2,500
Search/Collection                  1,000
Target Data Acq 1,000
Target Data Processing         2,000
Format Report                           600
Quality Control Report               700
Transmit Report                      1,600
Total                                      $11,400
Traditional Accounting KVA Process Costing










t Explains how it was spent
 
 
As seen in Table 1, total value is captured in two key metrics: ROI and ROK.   
While ROI is the traditional financial ratio, ROK identifies how a specific process 
converts existing knowledge into process outputs so decision-makers can quantify 
costs and measure value derived from investments in productive assets.   A higher 
ROK signifies better utilization of knowledge assets.  If IT investments, such as 
existing IWS systems, do not improve the ROK value of a given process, steps must 
be taken to improve that process’s function and performance.   
Table 1.  KVA Metrics 
Metric Description Type Calculation 






Outputs-Benefits in Common Units 
Cost to Produce Output 
Return on Investment 
(ROI) 
Same as ROI at the sub-






B. Risk Analysis:  Real Options (RO)  
Potential strategic investments can then be evaluated with real options 
analysis based on KVA data. This analysis is a robust and analytical process 
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incorporating the risk identification (applying various sensitivity techniques), risk 
quantification (applying risk-based Monte Carlo simulation), risk valuation (applying 
real options analysis), risk mitigation (utilizing real options framing), and risk 
diversification (employing analytical portfolio optimization)  using the Real Options 
SLS and Risk Simulator software programs.   Figure 4 reflects the complex 
calculations for integrated risk analysis in KVA+RO. 
Figure 4.  Integrated Risk Analysis 
4. Dynamic Monte Carlo 
simulation
A            B             
C              
D                 
E
1. List of projects and 
strategies to evaluate
Start with a list of projects or 
strategies to be evaluated… these 
projects have already been 
through qualitative screening
Time Series Forecasting
2. Base case projections for each 
project
…will the assistance of time-
series forecasting and 
historical data…
3. Develop static financial 
models with KVA data
…the user generates a traditional 
series of static base case financial 
(discounted cash flow) models for 
each project…
…sensitivity and scenario analysis 
coupled with Monte Carlo simulation is 
added to the analysis and the financial 




5. Framing Real Options 6. Options analytics, simulation and optimization
…real options analytics are calculated 
through binomial lattices and closed-form 
partial-differential models with 
simulation…
8. Reports presentation and 
update analysis
…create reports, make decisions, 
and do it all again iteratively over 
time…
…the relevant projects are 
chosen for real options 
analysis and the project or 
portfolio real options are 
framed…







Loss cost reduction  
Loss of market leadership  
Revenue enhancement 
Cost reduction  
Strategic  options value 
Strategic  competi tiveness 
High cost outlay  
Decision
Optimizat ion
…stochastic optimization is the next 
optional step if multiple projects exist that 
requires efficient asset allocation given 
some budgetary constraints… useful for 
strategic portfolio management…
Project Value
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C. Beyond Concept: KVA+RO Implementations 
Moving beyond a concept stage, the KVA+RO framework is being 
implemented in SPAWAR and in the Army Rapid Equipping Force project.  KVA+RO 
is being used in both projects to improve processes, reduce cycle-times and costs, 
and increase value by  allowing Navy executives to acquire intelligence systems via 
a portfolio approach and by getting the Army troops in the field (i.e., Iraq and 
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V.  Proof-of-Concept Case Study: Situational 
Awareness Onboard AEGIS and SSDS Platforms5  
This proof of concept case study is designed to assist PEO IWS, Open 
Architecture Division, with its mandate of implementing OA in the Navy.  The case is 
prepared from a warfighter perspective because the value of OA must be proven to 
the ultimate end-user. This perspective also permits a review of how OA can lead to 
flexible system acquisition and development to enable reengineered processes that 
will provide better performance in core warfighting processes such as SA. 
In a multi-phased approach, KVA+RO was applied to SA-track management 
procedures used in the AEGIS and SSDS platforms.  As illustrated in Figure 5, the 
total functionalities of AEGIS and SSDS systems are very broad so we focused our 
research on SA because it appeared to be the most promising area for upgrading 
and reengineering according to subject matter experts.  The goals of this research 
were to: 
• Demonstrate the efficacy of the KVA-RO framework to evaluate 
reengineering designs for warfighting core processes (i.e., SA-track 
management) in terms of the ROI and strategic option value of various 
OA approaches to replacing aging IWS systems. 
• Determine which elements of the track management process could be 
reengineered using an OA approach  
• Identify areas of improvement for current surface ship track-
management processes using the existing two IWS systems: 
AEGIS and SSDS.   
                                            
5  Information collected from subject-matter experts (SMEs) from Surface Warfare Fleet and training commands at Dahlgren 
(AEGIS) and Wallops Island (SSDS).  Information gathered from SMEs then aggregated to provide an average for each 
process to ensure accuracy.  Additional information collected, including process flow diagrams, use-case diagrams and 
literature review, to develop baseline data.  
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Figure 5.  Planned Reuse of Aegis and SSDS in DD(X) 






























































































































































































Source:  MacRitchie, J., “Open Architecture & SNSC2,” Presentation June 29, 2005, p. 12. 
A. Background 
In the late 1990s, the DoD articulated a vision for network-centric (or “net-
centric”) warfare in which networking military forces would facilitate information 
sharing and collaboration, leading to enhanced SA.  Information superiority is vital to 
enhanced SA, rapid decision-making, improved efficiency, speedy execution and 
mission effectiveness.   A high degree of interoperability is required to achieve 
information superiority.6  Lack of interoperability between the services makes it 
difficult for the warfighter to distinguish “friend” from “foe” and to make critical 
decisions—potentially delaying military response times or contributing to lethal 
mistakes.  Figure 6 shows a scenario in which a sea-based system and a land-
                                            
6  The DoD defines interoperability as the ability of systems, units, or forces to exchange data, information, materiel, and 
services to enable them to operate effectively together. 
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based system are tracking aircraft and are unable to integrate their views of a 
battlefield.   
Figure 6.  Scenario for Tracking Threats without Benefit of Interoperable 
Systems 
 
Source: Government Accountability Office. (2006, January). DOD management approach and processes not 
well-suited to support development of global information grid. Washington, DC. GAO Report GAO-06-
211, p.6. 
 
To achieve information superiority and enable net-centric warfare, the DoD 
has been developing the Global Information Grid (GIG).  Interoperable systems are 
critical to the GIG for joint military operations and to allow users access to data on 
demand, to share information in real-time and to collaborate in decision-making from 
almost any location.  Development of this capability is ultimately dependent on 
support from reengineered SA systems within IWS suites. 
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B. Naval Challenges 
The Navy must develop architectures that meet the integration requirements 
for the GIG.  This is a critical requirement in designing and implementing new IWS 
systems built within the OA framework. In addition, the Navy must resolve the 
following issues that are a result of legacy technology systems, such as the aging 
IWS systems. 
• Limited computational and operational capability.  Systems operating 
at 99% capacity in non-stressed environments. 
• Difficulty or inability to add new warfighting missions.  “Stove-piped” 
systems diminish interoperability and ability to meet national security 
threats. 
• Prohibitive software maintenance costs.  Some $3+ billion spent 
across Future Years Defense Plan in PEO IWS to develop and maintain 
computer programs. Additional testing and certification required when new 
capabilities added. 
The Navy has historically acquired IWS systems that are proprietary in design 
and engineering, require unique parts, equipment, and services to support them, are 
supported by a limited number of suppliers, and become very expensive to maintain 
(Strei, 2003, April 1).  Moreover, systems and/or platforms were entirely eliminated 
rather than upgraded or modernized because of prohibitive costs.  Rapid 
technological obsolescence, compounded by exorbitantly escalating costs for 
proprietary systems are daunting challenges because design, development, and 
acquisition timelines can span as much as 15 years before a military platform 
reaches operating forces (Strei, 2003, April 1).    
C. Naval Open Architecture and Open Business Models 
OA and open-business models propel the Navy into the next era of joint 
interoperability while resolving legacy issues that provide new benefits, including: 
 Lower lifecycle costs for IWS systems.  Total cost of ownership 
decreases due to increased maintainability, interoperability, 
upgradeability and use of a wider variety of vendors. 
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 Better performing systems.  Ability to rapidly upgrade hardware and 
software with the latest technology enables greater capabilities, 
efficiencies and interoperability to enable reengineered warfighting 
processes. 
 Improved interoperability for joint warfighting.  Software reuse and 
modularity facilitates interoperability between systems that use an 
open architecture framework. 
 Facilitating competition and increasing cooperation between 
commercial and military electronics industries.  Moving away from 
proprietary systems enables a broader range of ideas and 
technological solutions.   
Guiding principles behind Naval OA are modularity, reusability, 
interoperability, lifecycle affordability and collaboration and competition.  In adopting 
an open, OA strategy based on commercially available, non-proprietary information 
technology (IT) standards, interfaces and formats, the Navy will need to increase 
collaboration (e.g., supported by readily available collaborative product lifecycle 
management technology) to spur competition and fuel innovation in the acquisition 
lifecycle. 
Ease of collaboration is critical to Naval OA to ensure that multiple vendors 
compete, including the smaller, more nimble companies.  Collaboration also 
provides the infrastructure necessary to facilitate all parties sharing critical 
requirements and performance information to reduce system modification, re-fresh 
or replacement cycle-times.  As such, collaborative capabilities will facilitate moving 
OA beyond a purely technical focus to a more encompassing open-business model, 
one advocated by CNO Admiral Mullen.  As noted earlier, Admiral Mullen’s vision for 
open architecture isn’t limited to systems built to a set of open standards, but 
focuses on open-business models tapping into a multiple-developer network to 
deliver innovative, cost-effective and rapid, spiral acquisition capabilities to the Navy.   
Migrating to an OA environment has been slow, however, despite the Navy’s 
early adoption of open source strategies.   Encouraged by the cost-effective 
advantages gained through the Acoustic Rapid commercial off –the-shelf 
Insertion/Advanced Processor Build (ARCI/APB) program, Admiral Mullen noted in a 
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recent memo his disappointment with the slow pace of adoption and advocated rapid 
transition to the open-business model (Fein, 2006, September 11).   
D. SA: Track-management Processes 
Track management, a fundamental capability inherent to all IWS SA 
capabilities for surface ships, is the process by which friendly and enemy forces are 
detected, identified, monitored, updated and communicated throughout the area of 
operations (AOR).  The track management process within a Combat Information 
Center (CIC) is very complex, sophisticated and involves multiple watch stations and 
technological systems.  AEGIS and SSDS have different SA procedures and 
policies, and track-management functions within the CIC.   Although variations exist 
in track-management processes, watch stations are fairly consistent on both AEGIS 
and SSDS ships.  Figure 7 is a generalized organizational chart of CIC personnel 
directly involved in track-management processes.7   











Track-management processes entail various sub-processes, as seen in 
Figure 8.8  This graphic is an aggregated view for both AEGIS and SSDS platforms 
consisting of four principal processes and 17 sub-processes. 
                                            
7  Although watch stations talk to specific tasks and responsibilities, in an actual CIC, all personnel listed can be actively 
involved in any, or all, aspects of track management (correlation, identification, tracking, and relaying).   
8   Figure derived from numerous SMEs from AEGIS and SSDS communities.  While sub-processes may differ from ship to 
ship, SMEs concluded that the four primary processes reflect track management procedures conducted within a CIC.  
SMEs agreed that the 17 sub-processes shown reflected individual tasks appropriate for this limited research. SMEs also 
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VI. Case Study Results: Potential Impact of OA 
The potential impact of OA on AEGIS and SSDS platforms was calculated 
through KVA+RO in a multi-phased approach.  In addition, KVA data estimates and 
real options models were based on the assumption that functional upgrades would 
primarily be in the SA area with the remaining modules providing at least the same 
capabilities as the current AEGIS IWS system.   
KVA methodology was first applied to derive potential benefits in SA 
processes within AEGIS and SSDS-class ships (i.e., 84 Destroyers and Cruisers).   
Track-management sub-processes by process category (and by watch station in 
Appendix B) were evaluated under four improvement scenarios (“As Is,” “To Be,” 
“Radical 1,” and “Radical 2”).  The following assumptions were used to calculate the 
data: 
 Integration with middleware until Category 3 Open Architecture 
Computing Environment (OACE) level has been reached for systems 
being evaluated  
 Use of OA approach to developing the IWS systems and use of 
Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment 
Steps in calculating KVA data were:  
1. Identify core processes and sub-processes. 
2. Establish common units and level of complexity to measure learning 
time. 
3. Calculate learning time (i.e., knowledge surrogate) to execute each 
sub-process. 
4. Designate sampling time period long enough to capture representative 
sample of the core processes’ final product or services output. 
5. Multiply learning time for each sub-process by number of times sub-
process executes during sample period. 
6. Calculate cost to execute knowledge (learning time and process 
instructions) to determine process costs. 
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7. Calculate ROK (ROK= Revenue/Cost) and ROI (ROK= Revenue-
Cost/Cost). 
During Phase 2, real options analysis focused on the options for improving 
(Leave and Layer option) or replacing (Retrofitting option) the AEGIS IWS system.  
The option to continue with the current proprietary systems approach was provided 
as a baseline for comparison purposes. Future research would allow us to examine 
all AEGIS modules for potential upgrading and would likely result in even higher ROI 
estimates as well as real options valuations. 
A. KVA Results: ROK and ROI  
ROK and ROI values provide insights into sub-processes that could be 
reengineered to achieve maximum operational efficiency.  Aggregated results for 
AEGIS and SSDS are shown Figures 9 and 10.   The “As Is” provides a baseline 
ROI/ROK performance measure for comparison of the three process reengineering 
designs. The three redesigns essentially represent the effects of increasing levels of 
automation in the track management process.  
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Figure 9.  KVA Results: ROK and ROI Estimates 






































































Figure 10.  KVA Results: ROK and ROI Estimates 






































































OA has the potential to provide these operational performance improvement 
benefits: decreased training time for operators of systems, decreased “touch time” 
on processes by replacing manual processes with new automated capabilities, and 
increased efficiency through seamless integration of multiple system components.   
As shown in Table 2 below, the cumulative impact of OA on the track-management 
processes results in significant improvement in three of four areas.  
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Table 2.  Process Reengineering Impacts:  Process Level and Cumulative 
 
 “To Be” “Radical 1” “Radical 2” Cumulative 
Impact 
CORRELATE  X x x 
TRACK X X x x 
IDENTIFY X x X x 
RELAY     
 
Tables 3 through 6 are ROK and ROI results by core processes and sub-
processes for AEGIS and SSDS. The ROI estimates demonstrate that as various 
system functionalities of the existing track-management process are upgraded, a 
corresponding performance improvement is derived in those areas.  This more 
detailed analysis suggests where OA based system upgrades should be applied to 
achieve the best results. For example, the core process of correlate and identify 
have the greatest potential to benefit from an OA approach to system development. 
These estimates also provide the basis for the real options analysis projections 
staged over a 9-year period. 
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Table 3.  Detailed ROK Estimates for AEGIS 
AS IS TO BE RAD 1 RAD 2
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information 3521% 3407% 3163% 2733%
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track" 9% 9% 2161% 1856%
Verify Other Track Sources 5% 5% 5% 4%
Correlate sub-total 1284% 1241% 1606% 1396%
TRACK
Monitor Suspect Tracks 2% 1% 1% 1%
Update Tracks 3% 3% 461% 410%
Update GCCS-M 3% 191% 184% 169%
Track sub-total 2% 6% 42% 36%
IDENTIFY
Verify IFF signal 902% 869% 806% 707%
Verify EW emissions 9% 9% 8% 609%
Verify Point of Origin 2% 4221% 3921% 3432%
Match Against ATO 2% 4306% 3990% 3482%
Match Against CommAir Profile 963% 935% 863% 743%
Match Against Intel Information 3% 3% 3% 3914%
Examine Kinematic Data 4% 4% 3% 3%
Obtain Visual ID 0% 0% 0% 0%
Conduct Verbal Query 1% 1% 1% 1%
Identify sub-total 108% 160% 150% 426%
RELAY
Send Over Links 13% 12% 11% 10%
Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units 2% 1% 1% 1%
Relay sub-total 3% 2% 2% 1%
TOTALS 312% 340% 373% 504%
 
Table 4.  Detailed ROK Estimates for  SSDS 
AS IS TO BE RAD 1 RAD 2
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information 3493% 3380% 3126% 2698%
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track" 9% 9% 2630% 2258%
Verify Other Track Sources 5% 5% 4% 4%
Correlate sub-total 1274% 1231% 1612% 1401%
TRACK
Monitor Suspect Tracks 2% 1% 1% 1%
Update Tracks 4% 3% 646% 575%
Update GCCS-M 2% 114% 110% 101%
Track sub-total 2% 4% 47% 40%
IDENTIFY
Verify IFF signal 890% 857% 792% 695%
Verify EW emissions 10% 9% 9% 574%
Verify Point of Origin 2% 3789% 3505% 3067%
Match Against ATO 2% 3913% 3610% 3149%
Match Against CommAir Profile 1026% 996% 916% 788%
Match Against Intel Information 3% 3% 3% 3788%
Examine Kinematic Data 4% 4% 4% 4%
Obtain Visual ID 0% 0% 0% 0%
Conduct Verbal Query 1% 1% 1% 1%
Identify sub-total 112% 159% 148% 416%
RELAY
Send Over Links 18% 17% 16% 14%
Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units 1% 1% 1% 1%
Relay sub-total 3% 2% 2% 2%
Totals 312% 337% 371% 499%
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Table 5.  Detailed ROI Estimates for AEGIS 
AS IS TO BE RAD 1 RAD 2
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information 3421% 3307% 3063% 2633%
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track" -91% -91% 2061% 1756%
Verify Other Track Sources -95% -95% -95% -96%
Correlate sub-total 1184% 1141% 1506% 1296%
TRACK
Monitor Suspect Tracks -98% -99% -99% -99%
Update Tracks -97% -97% 361% 310%
Update GCCS-M -97% 91% 84% 69%
Track sub-total -98% -94% -58% -64%
IDENTIFY
Verify IFF signal 802% 769% 706% 607%
Verify EW emissions -91% -91% -92% 509%
Verify Point of Origin -98% 4121% 3821% 3332%
Match Against ATO -98% 4206% 3890% 3382%
Match Against CommAir Profile 863% 835% 763% 643%
Match Against Intel Information -97% -97% -97% 3814%
Examine Kinematic Data -96% -96% -97% -97%
Obtain Visual ID -100% -100% -100% -100%
Conduct Verbal Query -99% -99% -99% -99%
Identify sub-total 8% 60% 50% 326%
RELAY
Send Over Links -87% -88% -89% -90%
Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units -98% -99% -99% -99%
Relay sub-total -97% -98% -98% -99%
Totals 212% 240% 273% 404%
 
Table 6.  Detailed ROI Estimates for SSDS 
AS IS TO BE RAD 1 RAD 2
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information 3393% 3280% 3026% 2598%
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track" -91% -91% 2530% 2158%
Verify Other Track Sources -95% -95% -96% -96%
Correlate sub-total 1174% 1131% 1512% 1301%
TRACK
Monitor Suspect Tracks -98% -99% -99% -99%
Update Tracks -96% -97% 546% 475%
Update GCCS-M -98% 14% 10% 1%
Track sub-total -98% -96% -53% -60%
IDENTIFY
Verify IFF signal 790% 757% 692% 595%
Verify EW emissions -90% -91% -91% 474%
Verify Point of Origin -98% 3689% 3405% 2967%
Match Against ATO -98% 3813% 3510% 3049%
Match Against CommAir Profile 926% 896% 816% 688%
Match Against Intel Information -97% -97% -97% 3688%
Examine Kinematic Data -96% -96% -96% -96%
Obtain Visual ID -100% -100% -100% -100%
Conduct Verbal Query -99% -99% -99% -99%
Identify sub-total 12% 59% 48% 316%
RELAY
Send Over Links -82% -83% -84% -86%
Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units -99% -99% -99% -99%
Relay sub-total -97% -98% -98% -98%
Totals 212% 237% 271% 399%  
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Table 7 summarizes how OA could specifically impact the sub-processes 
deriving most significant improvements:  “Identify ‘Same Contact, Multiple Track',”  
“Update GCCS-M,”  “Update Track,”  “Verify Point of Origin,” “Match against ATO,”  
“Verify EW Emissions” and “Match Against Intel Information.”   Each watch station at 
the CIC was affected (see Appendix B). 
Table 7.  Potential Impact of OA at Sub-process Levels 
 






• Reduces reliance on manual identification of multiple tracks and updating current tracks. 
• Automatically corrects anomaly of multiple tracks per target and update tracks. Only brief 
confirmation by the watch station operator necessary. 
TRACK “Update GCCS-M” • Enhances operational value of systems through reduced time, manpower and training required to conduct process. 
TRACK “Update Track” 
• Reduces reliance on manual identification of multiple tracks and updating current tracks. 
• Automatically corrects multiple tracks per target anomaly and update tracks, resulting in 
brief confirmation by watch station operator. 
IDENTIFY “Verify Point of Origin” 
• Enables greater sensor and data integration, providing enhanced correlation in 
pinpointing origin of aircraft or ship. 
• Queries point of origin for friendly force contacts from an open GCCS-M system, and 
interrogates ATO neutral-force contacts from host nation airports (assuming data format 
standardized and provided by host nations.). 
• Facilitates interfaces to other systems to provide automated query for point of origin. 
• Frees watch standers to perform other tasks while providing faster data flow. 
IDENTIFY “Match Against ATO” 








• Facilitates COTS-based environment for easier  upgrades to accommodate greater 
processor speeds. 
• Enhances CIC efficiency through more timely SA. 
• Frees operators to perform other tasks. 
IDENTIFY “Match Against Intel Information” • Streamlines sub-process with automatic updates requiring merely manual confirmation. 
 
B. Value-risk Analysis:  Strategic Real Options Analysis 
Real options analysis was performed to determine the prospective value of 
alternative COAs for upgrading the AEGIS IWS in track management over a nine-
year period with KVA data inputs.  In all new options for IWS deployment, it was 
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assumed that a collaborative technology infrastructure was present to facilitate the 
use of the OA system and open-business model approaches.9 
Figure 11 illustrates the three main strategies laid out as a real options map.  
Strategy A is do nothing, leaving everything “As Is” with the ability to retire ships and 
their AEGIS systems within 10 years. Strategy B is the “DDX Open Architecture” 
(retrofit) option with new development within the first three years at a cost of $8 
billion.  Under this strategic path, follow-up is required—with retrofitting costing an 
additional $16 billion within 6 years after first-phased new development has been 
completed.  Strategy C looks at the “Leave and Layer” option with a three-phased 
sequential compound option of  “To Be,”  “ Radical 1,”, and “Radical 2”  
implementation within 9 years.  
 
                                            
9  Estimates are based on historical data and additional information provided by SMEs.  We have attempted to be as 
conservative as possible and have assumed very high potential volatility in both of the new IWS development options. 
Access to more precise performance data will help resolve uncertainties and risks over time.  
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AS-IS strategy where the older 
ships are retired within 10 
years and no further 
development action is taken.
DDX Open Architecture 
approach of new development 
within 3 years followed by 
retrofitting within 6 years, with 
an option to exit and abandon 
before the retrofitting phase.
AEGIS Open Architecture with 
a Leave & Layer approach, 
followed by a 9-year sequential 
option of stage-gate investment 
of To-Be, Radical, and Radical 
II, with the options to exit and 
abandon at any phase.
Do nothing for now
Stop after new development 
without retrofitting
Do nothing

















Do not continue 
development




Anytime within 3 years
Anytime within 6 years 
(after To-Be)
Anytime within 9 years 
(after Radical)
Do not continue 
development
Option Value = $12B
Total Cost = $10B
Option Value = $23.2B
Total Cost = $24B  
Option Value = $58.8B  
Total Cost = $9.09B   
 
Strategy C is the option with the greatest potential value.  As seen in Table 8 
below, Strategy C provides 4.9 times the risk adjusted return of the “As Is” strategy 
versus Strategy B at 1.9 times the return.  Strategy C’s incremental approach offers 
the lowest risk and numerous benefits, including less disruption to the rest of system 
and deriving benefits faster.  It is the lowest total cost alternative with costs spread 
over a nine-year period, yet the program reaps incremental benefits from various 







Table 8.  Real Options Valuation Results: Strategies A-C  
 Strategy A Strategy B Strategy C 
STRATEGIC OPTION 
“As Is” DDX OA “Develop and Retrofit” 
AEGIS OA 
“Leave & Layer” 
Net Present Value $12B $6.38B $27.52B 
Volatility 0% 80.5% 86.3% 
Real Options Value $12B $23.155B $58.84B 
Strategic Real Options-
based Return on Investment N/A 72.36% 224.75% 
Total Cost $10B $24B $9.09B 
Strategic Real Options-
based Relative Return Ratio 1.0 1.9 4.9 
Notes:  
(1) The volatility measure quantifies uncertainty and risk levels in the strategy and calibrates them to account 
for the time required to complete the entire strategy. 
(2) Strategic real options values are also computed, accounting for value of open architecture as laid out in 
the phased-gate development process.  
(3) Strategic real options-based return on investment looks at real options valuation results and computes ROI 
based on the option values and implementation of costs each phase. The higher this ROI value, the more 
strategic and valuable or profitable a project.  
“Leave and Layer” allows organizations to benefit from incremental adoption.  
Rather that executing a plan that requires everything to be accomplished at once, 
“leave and layer” enables existing systems to be reused successfully.  NAVFAC 
successfully adopted the approach to provide a more efficient, lower cost contract 
management solution.   NAVFAC architected a technology platform to allow it to 
build a layer of Web-based collaborative project management tools, while leveraging 
existing financial, HR, and scheduling systems.  A number of applications were 
developed, including the collaborative eProjects application with a budget of 
$350,000 and completion in 10 months (Oracle, 2004). eProjects provides one-click 
schedule and cost status.  Another application, eContracts, automates nearly 200 
redundant screens per contract action. 
In our analysis, Strategy B has the highest cost due to high up-front costs 
required to build the system within the first five years without deriving any benefits 
from the new system during that time.  Both strategies B and C require the use of 
collaborative infrastructure to enable the open business model that would be most 
likely to produce these real options values.  Strategy C, in fact, relies most heavily 
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on collaboration to enable the kinds of benefits in rapid, spiral acquisition with 
greater competition and innovation from smaller players. 
Summary 
IWS systems that were developed in a closed, proprietary model have 
performed well and provide substantial returns.  However, a new paradigm is 
required to maintain military superiority and wage information-age warfare.  Through 
open-system development and open-business models, benefits such as reusable 
code, lower maintenance-upgrade costs, and greater vendor flexibility in supporting 
system modules could be derived.  Moreover, the Navy can leverage new 
technology by quickly adopting it to military needs.  
Significant investments are required for the infrastructure necessary to enable 
all parties (acquirers, users, developers) to collaborate easily and effectively in the 
new open-business model.  Analytical tools are also required to track performance of 
the multiple parties involved in the development, acquisition and use of new system 
capabilities, in conjunction with the ability to adjust options models as uncertainties 
and risks are resolved over time.  Performance measurement systems (i.e. KVA 
performance accounting software) and predictive, forecasting software programs 
plus risk certification training provide additional analytic support to achieve IWS 
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Appendix A.  Case Study Notes 
1. Methodology 
Case Study Approach: 
The learning-time approach to KVA is used to conduct sub-process scenario 
analyses of “As Is,”  “Radical 1,” and “Radical 2.”    Core elements of KVA (such as 
“time-to-learn,” “number of personnel involved,” and “times fired”) produce a ratio of 
knowledge capital (ROK) resident in each process.  ROK derives a common unit of 
measurement for each sub-process within the track-management process. 
Data Collection:   
Collecting data to conduct KVA analysis was difficult due to the complex 
nature of track-management procedures in the CIC.  Outputs, learning time and 
touch time of the many sub-processes that comprise the entire procedure are not 
generally collected or retained.  Also, training times and required OJT are targeted at 
specific watch stations rather than at specific processes within the Navy.  
Consequently, data was derived through numerous interviews with SMEs and review 
of Personal Qualification Standards (PQS).  Multiple SMEs were contacted to collect 
an aggregated sample.   
“To Be” Data:    
Analysis based of situations that SMEs identified as optimal  areas where 
open architecture could provide value to the operator.  In addition,  technical and 
legal issues of the “To Be” scenario were not assessed. 
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2. Discussion of Basic Assumptions Used in Calculations 
Cost and Revenue Data 
• Calculations based on a ship performing SA and track management 
processes 24 hours a day, 7 days a week operating an average of 35 
weeks per year.   
• Net present value in total revenue estimates is based on a 30-year 
system-life expectancy of ship. 
• A contractor-margin approach was used to generate surrogate 
comparable revenue estimates.  Contractor margin is defined as the 
amount market place would pay a group of contractors, with levels of 
knowledge comparable to the existing team, to perform the activities of 
the track management team (e.g the margin over current Navy costs 
for the track management team).  This market-comps approach was 
used because there were no commercial processes directly 
comparable to track management activities in the military. Future 
studies would allow a wider range of potential commercially 
comparable processes to be assessed for comparability/fit revenue 
estimates. 
• Surrogate comparable revenue estimates are conservative given that 
revenue calculations were based on six people in the SA, track-
management process.  In reality, more people may be involved in this 
process.   
New Development/Retrofitting DD(x) 
• PV Asset New Development: Calculated by translating hourly revenue 
of the combined SSDS/AEGIS “AS-IS” estimates to yearly revenue, 
calculating the present value of the yearly revenue based on a 30-year 
lifecycle, and assuming retrofitting on all current 84 Aegis 
destroyers/cruisers. 
• PV Asses Retrofitting: Calculated by translating hourly revenue of the 
combined SSDS/AEGIS RADICAL estimates to yearly revenue, 
calculating the present value of the yearly revenue based on a 30-year 
lifecycle, and assuming retrofitting on all current 84 AEGIS 
destroyers/cruisers.   
• Cost to Execute: Based on estimation from SMEs and refining based 
on historical costs of AEGIS.* 
• Operations/Maintenance Costs: Based on historical costs of AEGIS 
and scaled down to account for open architecture. 
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• Timing: Based on estimates by SMEs. 
Leave and Layer/AEGIS 
• PV Asset: Calculated by translating hourly revenue of the combined 
SSDS/AEGIS estimates to yearly revenue, calculating the present 
value of the yearly revenue based on a 30-year lifecycle, and taking 
into account current placement on 84 destroyers/cruisers.   
• Cost to Execute: Based on $5 billion development costs and scaled 
according to increases in knowledge units. 
• Operations/Maintenance Costs: Based on historical costs of AEGIS 
and scaled down to account for open architecture. 
• Timing: Based on estimates by SMEs. 
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3. Use of Data in Case Study Calculation 
Item Definition Comments 
No. of 
Personnel 
Sailors and officers involved 




Times each sub-process 
acted upon by watch- 
stander. 
• Actions predicated on amount of contacts (air and surface) encountered during a 
typical hour within the CIC.  Each contact must be acted upon. 
• Estimates based on a typical, six-month deployment. 




Specific amount of time 
required to accomplish action 
every time sub-process acted 
upon. 
• Data captured in hourly units. 
• Although actions require only seconds, category captures data in hours to 
maintain continuity of units of time throughout analysis. 
Total Work 
Time 
Total amount of time each 
sub-process acted upon 
within an hour. 
• Formula=  “AWT”  x  “Actions per Hour”  
• Analysis in hourly units:  when “Total Work Time” for each of sub-processes 
added together for each of the watch stations, total aggregate should remain 




Total amount of time required 
to learn given sub-process.   
• Learning time can be an aggregate of formal schools, distance learning, on-the-
job training (OTJ) or any other training experience that falls under definition of 
“learning.”   
• For this case, comprised of formal school training and OJT provided aboard ship.  
• Basic assumptions to ensure consistent estimates from SMEs:  
a. Officer-SSDS 
Individual completing initial officer training with no prior SSDS platform experience.  It 
was also necessary to determine formal schools represented by this category.  While 
each school’s duration is considerably longer than hours represented in the “ALT” 
category, estimates based on the aggregated amount of time devoted to teaching 
given sub-process from each school: SSDS Basic Operator Course of Instruction, 
SSDS Advanced Operator Course of Instruction, and SSDS Warfare Operator 
Course of Instruction. 
b. Officer-AEGIS 
Individual completing officer training with no prior AEGIS platform experience. It was 
also necessary to determine formal schools represented by this category.  While 
each school’s duration is considerably longer than the hours represented in the 
“ALT” category, estimates based on aggregated amount of time devoted to teaching 
the given sub-process from each school: AEGIS Training Course, SWOS TAO 
School, and TAO Simulator Training. 
c. Enlisted-SSDS 
Individual completed boot camp with no prior SSDS platform experience. It was also 
necessary to determine formal schools represented by this category.   While each 
school’s duration considerably longer than hours represented in the “ALT” category, 
estimates determined based on aggregated amount of time devoted to teaching the 
given sub-process from each school:  OS “A” School,  SSDS Basic Operator Course 
of Instruction, SSDS Advanced Operator Course of Instruction, and SSDS Warfare 
Operator Course of Instruction (E5 and above). 
d. Enlisted-AEGIS 
Individual completed boot camp with no prior AEGIS platform experience. It was also 
necessary to determine formal schools represented by this category.  While each 
school’s duration is considerably longer than hours represented in the “ALT” 
category, estimates based on aggregated amount of time that devoted to teaching 
given sub-process from each school: OS “A” School and AEGIS Console Operator 
Course. 
Rank Order An ordinal ranking of sub- 
processes provides a means 
to ensure the “ALT” estimates 
are reliable and as accurate 
as possible.   
• Allowing SMEs to rank/order each of the sub-processes (1 being the least 
complex), outside the context of units of time, facilitates a mathematical 
correlation achieved between “Rank Order” and “ALT” categories.   
• If correlation is .80 or higher, “ALT” numbers can be considered an accurate 
reflection of the sub–process’s complexity.   
• If correlation is below .80, “ALT” estimates should be closely scrutinized and 
possibly reevaluated after providing a better explanation of the “ALT” components 
to the SMEs. 
Percent Percent of automation for 
each sub-process.   
• Captures knowledge embedded within the IT so that it can be accounted for in 





performed by information technology systems and does not require the actions of 
an operator.  
• Each sub-process is represented by a percentage between 0 and 100.  A number 
of 100% indicates sub-process is completely automated and does not require a 
watch stander to accomplish any portion of the task.   
• If number is 0%, no automation exists, and the watch-stander completes the entire 
sub-process manually.  Numbers falling between extremes are estimates based 
on SME observations and experience. 
Total Learning 
Time (TLT) 
Provides total time required 
to learn sub-process, 
including that learning time 
which is resident within the 
IT system.   
• Determined by “Actual Learning Time” by the “Percent Information Technology” 
category.   
• Formula  =  ALT/(1-%IT).   
• For instance:  If it takes 2 hours to learn a system that is 50% automated, then the 
total learning time for that system (to include the learning time that is embedded in 
the system itself) would be 4 hours. 
Numerator 
 
Revenue generated by 
knowledge required to 
perform sub-process.    
• Revenue allocated to the amount of knowledge; amount of knowledge resident in 
sub-process.   
• Formula=  “Number of Personnel”  x  “Actions per Hour”  x “Total Learning Time”  
Denominator Cost associated with 
producing sub-process 
output.    





Represents how well 
knowledge assets in 
organization are distributed 
based upon cost and value 
each provides.   
 
• With every sub-process, there is a cost and revenue (or value) associated with 
generating an output.  While these costs and values are captured in the 
“Numerator” and “Denominator” categories, there needs to be a way to quantify 
the knowledge embedded within an IT system.   
• ROK’s can be compared within a process to help determine if knowledge assets 
are being used in an efficient manner; if automation could be inserted to improve 
outputs; and if processes should be changed to promote efficiencies.   
• A low ROK does not automatically assume a process is inefficient or in need of 
automation, but rather is an indicator that a  sub-process may need further 
analysis to determine if it is using its knowledge assets in an efficient manner.    
 
 
4. Variability Report 
Average Work Time:  5% Variability—The time it takes to complete each action 
is relatively stable with little or no variability. 
Average Learning Time:  5% Variability—Estimates regarding average learning 
time are based on the time it takes an average person to 
learn each task, hence, low variability. 
Price:  Assume 60% of the time the position is priced at the 
average of the low and high estimates.  The remaining 
time is split 20-20 between the low and high values.  A 






Watch Station Cost Range (per hour)                         
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Tactical Action Officer (TAO)     $85 to $105, $80.00 to $110.00  
Anti-air Warfare Coordinator (AAWC)   $75 to $90, $72.00 to $92.00  
Surface Warfare Coordinator (SUWC)  $75 to $90, $72.00 to $92.00  
Combat Systems Coordinator (CSC)   $78 to $95, $69.00 to $89.00  
Tactical Information Coordinator (TIC)   $70 to $80, $65.00 to $85.00  
Identification Supervisor (IDS)   $70 to $80, $63.00 to $83.00  
Note: Prices provided by commercial vendors.   
Cost:  Assumes 60% of the time the position is filled by a 
person with the assumed pay grade.  The remaining time 
is split 20-20% between a person with one rank higher 
and one rank lower.10 A custom distribution is utilized to 
fulfill these requirements.   
 
Watch Station Years of Service Cost 
Tactical Action Officer (TAO): (0-5)  between 10-18 $38 
Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (AAWC): (0-4)  between 8-16   $34 
Surface Warfare Coordinator (SUWC): (0-3)  between 6-14   $30 
Combat Systems Coordinator (CSC): (E-8)  between 10-18   $27 
Tactical Information Coordinator (TIC): (E-6)  between 4-14   $17  
Identification Supervisor (IDS): (E-5)  between 3-8   $14 
Note:   Costs calculated by averaging monthly salary plus sea pay for the assumed 
ranks at low/high estimates of years in service. 
 
Actions per Hour:   A triangular distribution with min/max/most-likely values 
based on calculations from the following numbers. 
 Costal Open Water  High Density  
Number of Contacts per Hour 24-42 12-30  28-66 
Time in Location 15% 25% 60% 
Note: Data provided by SMEs
                                            
10 In the case of a TAO, assume 80% of the time the position is filled by an 0-5; in the case of an IDS, 
assume 80% or the time the position is filled by an E-5.  
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Appendix B.  KVA Results by Watch Station 
Figure B-1. AEGIS ROI Estimates 
 
Tactical Action Officer Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator Surface Warfare Coordinator
Obtain Link Information 3625% 3450% 3206% 2717%
Identify “Same Contact,Multiple Track” -91% -91% 2104% 1778%
Verify Other Track Sources -94% -94% -95% -96%
Correlate Sub-Total 1358% 1290% 1791% 1512%
TRACK
Monitor Suspect Tracks -98% -99% -99% -99%
Update Tracks -97% -97% 294% 235%
Update GCCS-M -95% 173% 154% 117%
Track Sub-Total -98% -97% -85% -87%
IDENTIFY
Verify IFF signal 645% 610% 561% 463%
Verify EW emissions -89% -89% -90% 540%
Verify Point of Origin -98% 3450% 3206% 2717%
Match Against ATO -98% 3450% 3206% 2717%
Match Against CommAir Profile 831% 788% 727% 604%
Match Against Intel  Information -97% -97% -97% 3813%
Examine Kinematic Data -96% -96% -97% -97%
Obtain Visual ID -100% -100% -100% -100%
Conduct Verbal Query -99% -99% -99% -99%
Identify Sub-Total 55% 152% 134% 596%
RELAY
Send Over Links -91% -91% -92% -93%
Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units -99% -99% -99% -99%
Relay Sub-Total -98% -100% -100% -100%
TOTAL 306% 347% 389% 558%
5091% 4907% 4525% 3979%
-87% -87% 2983% 2619%
-92% -92% -93% -94%
1932% 1860% 2546% 2233%
-98% -98% -98% -98%
-96% -96% 451% 386%
- - - -
-97% -97% -50% -56%
938% 901% 825% 716%
-89% -91% -92% 827%
-97% 4907% 4525% 3979%
-97% 4907% 4525% 3979%
1198% 1152% 1056% 920%
-96% -96% -96% 5565%
-95% -95% -95% -96%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
84% 197% 174% 689%
-87% -87% -88% -90%
-98% -98% -98% -99%
-98% -98% -98% -98%
354% 400% 451% 640%
2441% 2304% 2230% 2044%
-94% -94% 1453% 1329%
-96% -96% -96% -97%
497% 465% 476% 431%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-98% -98% 177% 155%
-97% 85% 79% 65%
-97% -55% 47% 36%
408% 381% 366% 329%
-92% -93% -93% 387%
-99% 2304% 2230% 2044%
- - - -
- - - -
-98% -98% -98% 2878%
-97% -98% -98% -98%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-95% -93% -93% -26%
-94% -94% -94% -95%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-99% -100% -100% -100%
9% 13% 17% 64%
“AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2”
CORRELATE
“AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2” “AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2”
 
 
Figure B-2. AEGIS ROI Estimates (cont.) 
1040% 1034% 937% 743%
-97% -97% 591% 462%
-98% -98% -98% -99%
346% 344% 493% 383%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-99% -99% 65% 34%
- - - -
-99% -99% -94% -96%
128% 127% 107% 69%
-96% -96% -97% 113%
-99% 1411% 1282% 1025%
-99% 1411% 1282% 1025%
280% 278% 246% 181%
-99% -99% -99% 1462%
-98% -98% -99% -99%
- - - -
- - - -
-54% -50% -54% 148%
-96% -96% -97% -97%
- - - -
-96% -100% -100% -100%
54% 56% 73% 162%
Combat Systems Coordinator Tactical Information Coordinator Identification Supervisor
5012% 4889% 4510% 4146%
-87% -88% 2973% 2731%
-92% -92% -93% -93%
1901% 1853% 2537% 2329%
-98% -98% -98% -98%
-96% -96% 449% 405%
- - - -
-97% -97% -5% -13%
922% 898% 822% 749%
-85% -85% -86% 865%
-97% 4889% 4510% 4146%
-97% 4889% 4510% 4146%
1178% 1147% 1053% 962%
-96% -96% -96% 5797%
-95% -95% -95% -96%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
21% 69% 56% 242%
-87% -88% -88% -89%
-98% -98% -98% -99%
-98% -100% -100% -100%
228% 258% 297% 423%
5921% 5772% 5312% 4870%
-85% -85% 3508% 3213%
-91% -91% -92% -92%
2257% 2199% 2996% 2743%
-97% -98% -98% -98%
-96% -96% 544% 492%
- - - -
-97% -97% 11% 2%
1104% 1074% 982% 894%
-82% -82% -84% 1030%
-97% 5772% 5312% 4870%
-97% 5772% 5312% 4870%
1405% 1368% 1253% 1142%
-95% -95% -95% 6803%
-94% -94% -95% -95%
-99% -100% -100% -100%
-98% -99% -99% -99%
99% 182% 160% 503%
-85% -85% -86% -88%
-98% -98% -98% -98%
-95% -95% -95% -96%
298% 335% 382% 535%
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track"










Verify Point of Origin
Match Against ATO
Match Against CommAir Profile







Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units
Relay Sub-Total
TOTAL 
“AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2” “AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2” “AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2”
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Figure B-3. SSDS ROI Estimates 
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track"










Verify Point of Origin
Match Against ATO
Match Against CommAir Profile







Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units
Relay Sub-Total
TOTAL
Tactical Action Officer Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator Surface Warfare Coordinator
2129% 2025% 1871% 1578%
-94% -95% 1477% 1243%
-97% -97% -97% -97%
773% 732% 1045% 876%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-98% -98% 182% 140%
-97% 63% 52% 29%
-99% -98% -91% -92%
346% 325% 294% 236%
-93% -94% -94% 281%
-99% 2025% 1871% 1578%
-99% 2025% 1871% 1578%
457% 431% 393% 320%
-98% -98% -98% 2231%
-98% -98% -98% -98%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-99% -99% -100% -100%
-7% 51% 40% 314%
-94% -95% -95% -96%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-99% -100% -100% -100%
143% 168% 193% 294%
3006% 2896% 2655% 2329%
-92% -93% 2104% 1843%
-95% -95% -96% -96%
1116% 1073% 1502% 1312%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-98% -98% 294% 247%
- - - -
-98% -98% -70% -73%
521% 499% 451% 386%
-91% -91% -92% 452%
-98% 2896% 2655% 2329%
-98% 2896% 2655% 2329%
677% 649% 589% 507%
-97% -98% -98% 3273%
-97% -97% -97% -98%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
10% 78% 64% 370%
-92% -93% -93% -94%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
172% 199% 230% 343%
1420% 1339% 1292% 1181%
-96% -96% 1013% 925%
-98% -98% -98% -98%
257% 238% 245% 217%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-99% -99% 99% 83%
-98% 11% 7% -1%
-98% -73% -8% -15%
204% 188% 178% 156%
-95% -96% -96% 191%
-99% 1339% 1292% 1181%
- - - -
- - - -
-99% -99% -99% 1679%
-98% -99% -99% -99%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-100% -100% -100% -100%
-97% -96% -96% -56%
-96% -96% -97% -97%
-99% -100% -100% -100%
-99% -100% -100% -100%
-35% -33% -30% -2%
“AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2” “AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2” “AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2”
 
Figure B-4. SSDS ROI Estimates (cont.) 
CORRELATE
Obtain Link Information
Identify "Same Contact, Multiple Track"










Verify Point of Origin
Match Against ATO
Match Against CommAir Profile







Discuss Picture with Battle Force Units
Relay Sub-Total
TOTAL   
Combat Systems Coordinator Tactical Information Coordinator Identification Supervisor
2628% 2613% 2370% 1907%
-93% -93% 1876% 1505%
-96% -96% -96% -97%
968% 962% 1336% 1066%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-98% -98% 253% 187%
- - - -
-99% -99% -90% -92%
446% 443% 394% 301%
-92% -92% -93% 356%
-99% 2613% 2370% 1907%
-99% 2613% 2370% 1907%
582% 578% 517% 402%
-98% -98% -98% 2687%
-97% -97% -98% -98%
- - - -
- - - -
-17% -9% -17% 346%
-93% -93% -94% -95%
- - - -
-93% -100% -100% -100%
256% 260% 300% 459%
9076% 8856% 8141% 7487%
-77% -78% 6492% 5970%
-86% -86% -87% -88%
3492% 3406% 4690% 4310%%
-96% -96% -97% -97%
-93% -94% 1077% 984%
- - - -
-95% -95% 75% 61%
1735% 1691% 1548% 1417%
-72% -73% -75% 1624%
-95% 8856% 8141% 7487%
-95% 8856% 8141% 7487%
2194% 2139% 1960% 1797%
-92% -93% -93% 10437%
-91% -91% -92% -92%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-98% -98% -98% -98%
118% 203% 179% 512%
-77% -78% -79% -81%
-97% -97% -97% -97%
-96% -100% -100% -100%
489% 544% 613% 839%
10708% 10441% 9572% 8779%
-73% -74% 7638% 7003%
-83% -84% -85% -86%
4131% 4027% 5522% 5061%
-95% -96% -96% -96%
-92% -92% 1282% 1168%
- - - -
-94% -94% 105% 88%
2062% 2008% 1834% 1676%
-68% -68% -71% 1918%
-95% 10441% 9572% 8779%
-95% 10441% 9572% 8779%
2602% 2535% 2318% 2120%
-91% -91% -92% 12231%
-89% -89% -90% -91%
-99% -99% -99% -99%
-97% -97% -98% -98%
257% 406% 364% 977%
-73% -74% -76% -78%
-96% -96% -97% -97%
-91% -91% -92% -92%
615% 682% 766% 1040%
“AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2” “AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2” “AS IS” “TO BE” “RAD 1” “ RAD 2”
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Appendix C.  Real Options Analysis 
Table C-2. KVA Analysis with Monte Carlo risk-based simulations 
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Table C-3. Strategy B: Real Options Analysis Results 
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